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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economic regula-
tion emerged in a variety of industries to respond to certain perceived
problems. For most of these industries, students of economic regulation
became convinced over time that, whatever the correctness of the original
diagnosis, the regulatory cure was often worse than the market-imperfec-
tion disease. Moreover, new technology and changing markets often elimi-
nated the perceived problems that regulatory institutions were designed to
solve.' Partly as a consequence, a political reaction set in against regula-
tion, resulting in substantial deregulation of several previously regulated
industries.2
Changing an industry from a regulated to a free market status has not
always proven easy. Difficult transitions have been encountered. Such
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1. For example, railroads were originally regulated in the belief that they were abusing a monop-
oly of intercity freight transportation. Technological change in the form of the development of highly
competitive intercity motor carrier and barge industries (along with the necessary rights-of-way) per-
mitted competition for both bulk commodities and manufactured goods. But regulatory institutions
were unable to respond to the new competitive environment, and the rail industry began a long de-
cline that was only arrested by regulatory reform. Even when pockets of market power persisted in
the rail industry, regulatory cures were all-encompassing rather than narrowly tailored to the
problem.
2. Many regulated industries have participated in the deregulation movement. The most notable
industries undergoing some form of transition to deregulation are transportation, see Staggers Rail Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101a (1982)); Motor Carrier
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) and in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), electric utilities, see Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30 & 42 U.S.C.), gas
pipelines, see Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7255 (1982), 15 id. § 3301-3432), and telecommunications, see United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mere. sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Other industries undergoing some form of deregulation are broadcasting, fi-
nancial services, and energy. The postal services and oil pipeline industries are additional candidates.
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transitions, to succeed, must ensure the development of new institutions
and market practices-for example, contractual arrangements as ex-
plained below-to replace regulation in circumstances where some public
policy problems may remain, even if the regulatory answers do not. Ironi-
cally, in many instances these problems may be as much a creation of past
regulation as inherent in the industry or its markets. For example, as
regulatory institutions ossified, extreme forms of price discrimination that
could not have endured competitive forces were often seen as the solutions
to problems created by regulation itself. As the deregulation movement
has taken its course, concerns over the transition to deregulation have
therefore emerged from certain legacies bequeathed by prior regulatory
practices and policies, frequently resulting in various constituencies seek-
ing some form of residual regulation.' Demands for residual regulation
have been especially persistent whenever extreme forms of price discrimi-
nation have been suggested or have played a key role. While regulatory
institutions themselves arose partly in response to demands to suppress
price discrimination,4 the regulatory reform literature' has rightly con-
demned much of this attempt to eliminate price discrimination, some of
which was the natural result of short-term disequilibrium that would
eventually have cured itself had regulatory constraints not interfered. A
successful transition to deregulation, however, is often threatened by the
belief that extreme forms of price discrimination are the answer to the
problems of the transition to deregulation. This in turn gives rise to per-
verse and unexpected demands for residual regulation during the
transition.
In sum, the process of deregulation can be extremely complex in indus-
tries that have long been regulated. The legacy of regulation imposes sunk
costs and buyer/seller relationships during the transition that are very dif-
ferent from those that would have existed if a free-market environment
had always existed. Parts I and II explain the source of such concerns as
well as the ingredients for a successful solution. Part III presents and
3. Examples of demands for residual regulation may be found in each of the industries undergo-
ing a transition to deregulation. In the railroad industry, for example, captive shippers retained
residual regulation to protect "market dominant" traffic, and regulators retained powers to approve
mergers and regulate terms of joint services by carriers. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
retained rights to regulate motor carrier tariffs and to impose conditions for antitrust immunity for
collective ratemaking. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) , and later, the Department of Transpor-
tation, retained authority over consumer protection, mergers, route awards for international service,
terms of access for computer reservation systems, and slot allocations at capacity constrained airports.
These are only a few examples of residual regulation.
4. See A. FRIEDLAENDER & R. SPADY, FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION 1-13 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Horn, Rail Rate Equalization to and from Ports: Some Preliminary Comments on
Preliminary Content, 46 INTERSTATE COM. COMMISSION PRAC. J. 30 (1978); sources cited infra
note 25.
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evaluates some of the most common suggestions for coping with the transi-
tion and why some of these suggestions may have inherent limitations.
Part IV proposes a contractual approach, which focuses on what market
conditions would have been without the distortions of prior regulation and
sunk costs. These proposals are explicitly designed to facilitate a success-
ful transition to deregulation in which market forces play a prominent
and effective role.
I. The Legacy of Sunk Costs and Prior Agreements
Patterns in the demand for residual regulation can be explained as a
response to the strength of the entry threat relative to the magnitude of
sunk costs incurred by the affected parties in the previous regulatory re-
gime.' Where obstacles to entry are low, the incumbent suppliers, firms,
and labor, ordinarily seek some "protective conditions" during the transi-
tion to permit them to recover some or all of their sunk costs, such as
specialized labor skills and capital. In contrast, when the obstacles to entry
are high, customers are likely to demand protective conditions, particu-
larly when the customers' own sunk costs severely restrict their competi-
tive options after deregulation.
A demand for residual regulation during the transition to deregulation
thus usually arises from commitments made under the old regulatory
rules. Some of these commitments persist as fixed, yet-to-be-amortized in-
vestments. Some of these investments, by both customers and the previ-
ously regulated industries, might never have been made in the absence of
the regulatory rules. However, the very existence of these assets (their
sunk costs) influences negotiations in the new and freer market existing
after deregulation. Immediate market results during the transition are
constrained by the presence of prior agreements and sunk costs. Market
performance during the transition therefore cannot easily be equated with
a long-run equilibrium where deregulated prices and quantities are estab-
lished in the absence of sunk costs or agreements predicated on the as-
sumption of continued regulation. Furthermore, other markets or potential
contractual opportunities elsewhere in the economy can also be affected, as
for example when the sunk investments represent alternative sources of
supply.
A clean slate for negotiating a market-driven contract between the vari-
ous participants-a contract that provides incentives for all participants to
commit the needed capital under market rather than regulatory circum-
stances-will emerge only as the previously committed capital (sunk cost)
6. See Meyer & Tye, The Regulatory Transition, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 46 (Papers & Proc. 1985).
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is amortized. Until then, a common regulatory problem during the transi-
tion is to define a set of residual, self-terminating economic constraints
that will satisfy political demands for equity-and other considerations
created by the short-to medium-term continuation of sunk costs-without
creating insurmountable obstacles to approaching a market-determined
outcome in the long run.
Demands for continued regulation can also arise where competitive ac-
cess or network-interconnect problems occur, as in industries such as rail-
roads, gas pipelines, and telecommunications. Because elements of service
in an integrated network are sometimes characterized by economies of
scale and barriers to entry, at least in the short run, effective competition
is not always immediately possible across the entire spectrum of services
offered in the regulated industry.
A commonly proposed solution is to design policies that enhance compe-
tition wherever possible by giving all competitors access to the bottleneck
portions of the network on roughly equal terms' to prevent vertical fore-
closures of competition across the network.8 In most cases, the anticompe-
titive effects of these restrictions on entry should be attenuated over time,
for example, by entry, relocation, or product substitutions.9 Nevertheless,
limited provision for access and pricing rules on the monopoly portions of
the system are sometimes deemed necessary to effect a successful transi-
tion. When instituted, a balance must carefully be struck between de-
mands for re-regulation to solve what should be transitory problems and
the demands of special interest groups who hope to use artificial competi-
tive advantages that arise as a legacy of regulation to frustrate competition
during and after the transition.
7. For example, regulators in the rail industry were told that they should seek to become surro-
gates for contestability when setting rates for captive traffic. See Verified Statement of William J.
Baumol & Robert D. Willig at 25, Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, Ex Parte No. 347 (Sub-No.
1), 1 I.C.C.2d 520 (1985) [hereinafter Statement of Baumol & Willig]. Proponents of the theory of
contestability stated that "[riather than relying exclusively on traditional rate and entry regulation"
the appropriate policy was "government intervention to ensure equal access to the sunk facility"; that
all firms seeking such competitive access should get it; and that "the access price be reasonable."
Bailey & Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, I YALE J. ON REG. 111,
124 (1984) [hereinafter Contestable Markets]. Bailey applied these concepts to suggest policies for
open competitive access in the rail industry. See Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory
Policy, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 178 (Papers & Proc. 1981).
8. A vertical foreclosure arises where the firm owning the bottleneck restricts access to it or en-
gages in a restrictive practice that has a substantial adverse impact on competition in upstream or
downstream markets. See generally F. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS
(1978) (for general economic model of vertical control).
9. An example where a perceived bottleneck generally no longer exists is gate space at major
airports. During the early years of deregulation, access to gate space was perceived to be a bottleneck
because it was often tied up by exclusive contracts with incumbent carriers. As a result of either forced
divestiture or increased flexibility over time, gate space is generally not considered to be a barrier to
entry in the airline industry, although some exceptions remain.
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II. The Legacies of Regulation: High Costs and Excess Capacity
The problems raised by sunk costs incurred in a prior regulatory re-
gime often have been exacerbated by a legacy of uneconomic practices cre-
ated during that regime.' In particular, the regulatory equilibrium in the
prior period often amounted to an informal taxation and cross-subsidy
scheme in which individual prices seemed to have little to do with the
costs of individual services."
Such arbitrary pricing schemes rarely advanced economic efficiency; on
the contrary, some factors of production were often overgenerously re-
warded while others were underrewarded, and consequently some factors
were oversupplied and others undersupplied.' Similarly, political consid-
erations perpetuated some activities that never had any economic justifica-
tion.'" Finally, as part of their excise taxation and cross-subsidy schemes,
regulators often imposed operating or marketing constraints-for example
entry limitations or restrictions on operating authority that limited incum-
bents' ability to compete-that prevented efficient use of productive re-
sources. Furthermore, if the regulators did not impose such constraints,
labor unions often did, taking advantage of the peculiarly permissive char-
acter of labor negotiations in many regulated industries to achieve restric-
tive work rules and practices." As a result, many firms in recently de-
regulated industries were operating inefficiently and, in particular, had
excess or unneeded capacity-at least as long as demand and income elas-
ticities were not sufficient to absorb the excess when deregulation un-
leashed the industry from pricing and marketing shackles. 5
In the airline industry, this meant too many wide-body, long-range jets
10. For example, airline regulators maintained high profit margins for long-haul passengers to
cross-subsidize short-haul passengers. As shown below, this resulted in depressed prices for long-haul
markets and greater profitability on short-haul routes after deregulation.
11. See generally Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN.
211 (1976) (analysis and critique of Stigler model of regulation); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22 (1971) (regulation as form of taxation); Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (regulation designed and operated
primarily for benefit of industry).
12. For example, regulation induced a significant shortage of natural gas for interstate markets in
the 1970s; see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORm 240-60 (1982). Also, rail maintenance
under strict regulation failed to prevent a substantial decline in track quality. Restrictions on aban-
donment forced railroads to preserve a network that was too large in terms of miles of track. See A.
FRIEDLAENDER & R. SPADY, supra note 4, at 121-27.
13. For example, political considerations limited for many years the railroads' ability to shed
deficit passenger operations. See T. SEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT AND PUBLIC POLICY 30-31
(1983).
14. See Annable, The ICC, The IBT, and the Cartelization of the American Trucking Industry,
13 Q. REV. EcON. & Bus. 33, 37-43 (1973); Bohlander & Farris, Collective Bargaining in Truck-
ing-The Effects of Deregulation, 20 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 223, 228-30 (1984).
15. The great "miracle" of early "administrative" airline deregulation (1976-79) was that these
elasticities, fed and enhanced by general cyclical recovery, seemed sufficient to do this mopping up. See
AIRLINE DEREGULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 41-90 (J. Meyer & C. Oster eds. 1981).
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suitable for transcontinental and similar services but too few small,
narrow-body airplanes suitable for short hauls. In financial services, it
meant too many retail brokers and related support staff supplying infor-
mation and advice to investors; in petroleum refining, too many small
inefficient teakettle refineries whose very existence depended on privileged
access to low-cost domestic crude; in trucking, too many trailers and trac-
tors; in railroading, too many underused branch lines, boxcars, and; loco-
motives in natural gas production, too many deep wells and LNG tankers;
in broadcasting, too many over-the-air relay transmitters, known as local
stations; and, finally, in electric utilities, too many plans for conventional
and nuclear baseload expansion of generation.
Attached to each of these capacity excesses in most instances were, of
course, excess labor forces. Indeed, in the case of stock brokerage, labor
represented most of the excess. The costs of carrying excess workforce
were intensified for many newly deregulated industries because of their
excessively generous collective bargaining agreements, usually arrived at
prior to deregulation when the industry could simply pass such costs
through to consumers. Airline pilots were the most conspicuous example,
but over-the-road Teamsters, some rail operating brotherhoods, and others
were seemingly not far behind.
From both a public and private management perspective, the transition
problem lies in finding an alternative to the old regulatory regimes of ex-
cess costs and cross-subsidies while still meeting revenue needs. The best
solution, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, is to eliminate excess
services, capacity, and costs. However, that is sometimes easier said than
done. Capital equipment is usually durable and takes some time to be
physically exhausted. Uneconomic services often have constituencies that
use the political process to delay abandonment. Labor contracts normally
have a fixed term and benefits which, once won, are typically not quickly
forsaken by unions; indeed, management may view a rollback of labor
benefits as a last recourse, because of the problems such rollbacks can
cause. Furthermore, ability to extract labor rollbacks will depend on the
extent to which labor perceives a real threat to job security; easy-entry
industries like airlines and trucking have been more successful in ob-
taining such rollbacks than the hard-to-enter railroad industry. But even
with labor concessions, cost cutting will normally not solve all the fiscal
problems of a deregulated industry, especially in the short to me-
dium-three to five year-term.
Again, some problems observed during transition, including misaligned
tariffs as well as excess capacity, may be temporary legacies of prior regu-
lation rather than inherent features of the long-run industry structure. In
the United States airline industry, for example, regulators allowed higher
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markups over direct costs on long-haul markets than on short hauls,
where tariffs were often set below direct costs; the result was an oversup-
ply of long-haul aircraft that manifested itself in transcontinental rate
wars after deregulation. Similarly, regulatory and tax incentives created a
surplus of rail boxcars that has resulted in sharp downward pressure on
boxcar rates since deregulation; much the same process, involving a sur-
plus of tractors and trailers, seems to have been at work lowering many
motor carrier tariffs.
Maintaining revenue adequacy, at least by many common definitions,
can be a problem for previously regulated firms in this new environment.
After deregulation, rates in highly competitive markets were under severe
pressure. Indeed, where too much capacity exists during the transition,
rates under competition should tend toward short-run average variable
costs until excess capacity is eliminated. In these markets, contributions to
overhead and other unassignable costs should be driven toward zero.
These pricing actions pose the question of how to define short and long-
run revenue adequacy. If revenue adequacy is defined as return on all
investment 6 sufficient in the short run to meet the broad financial market
cost of the underlying capital requirements, rather exceptional returns
may have to be garnered from the less competitive markets served by the
deregulated industry during the transition. Of course, the very concept
and definition of revenue adequacy has been hotly disputed. Not only is
there a question of what should be included in the equity base, or denomi-
nator, but arguments could be made that availability of capital to an in-
dustry depends on its degree of systematic risk (relative to realized re-
turns) and possibly the dispersion and modality of returns as well.
III. Coping with the Competitive Access and Sunk Cost Problems
In response to differing deregulation experiences across industries, vari-
ous solutions to the competitive access problem have arisen. Typical ex-
amples include mandatory interconnections with competitors, line-of-
business restrictions, divestiture, such as the Bell Operating Companies
from AT&T,1 7 or "unbundling", such as the transportation and energy
16. The investment base for defining revenue adequacy during a transition to deregulation has
been the subject of considerable debate. The two principal candidates are original cost less deprecia-
tion and reproduction cost new less depreciation (or trended original costs). The revenue requirements
of the latter usually exceed the former, but many firms undergoing the transition have achieved
neither standard. See Myers, Kolbe & Tye, Inflation and Rate of Return Regulation, in 2 RE-
SEARCH IN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 83 (T. Keeler ed. 1985).
17. For a review of the competitive access issues and solutions in the telecommunications industry,
see Baker & Baker, Antitrust and Communications Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1983);
Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (1984); MacAvoy &
Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and its Impact on Telecommunications, I
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components of price in natural gas markets.'" Elsewhere, regulations have
been designed to give all competitors equal access to vital marketing chan-
nels. Examples of these regulations include the attempt to achieve unbi-
ased computer reservations systems in the airline industry 9 and the award
of trackage rights over a merged rail carrier's system to restore competi-
tion ostensibly eliminated as a consequence of merger."
Despite differences in industries and particular policy suggestions, these
approaches share a common feature: all govern vertical relationships
among competitors. Regulators have tried to establish reasonable terms of
access to the remaining limited access portions of the network-or, equiv-
alently, to solve the "revenue divisions" problem where the carriers are
joint ventures in a situation of limited entry possibilities-so that effective
competition may be enhanced in the rest of the system during the
transition.
A. Regulation During the Transition
Some economists have suggested that during the transition to deregula-
tion regulators should seek a "surrogate for competition unimpeded by
entry barriers."'" An appropriate surrogate, it has been suggested, would
be the results of a "contestable market"-a market subject to costless hit-
and-run entry-where entry is difficult and sunk costs substantial such as
railroads and pipelines.2" The underlying concept is that in "a perfectly
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983); MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year
of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225 (1985); see also MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
18. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408 (1985), vacated sub nom., Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
For a review of the antitrust issues, see Mahinka & Johnson, New Antitrust Issues in a Deregulated
Environment: Access to Pipelines, 4 ENERGY L.J. 211 (1983); Mogel & Gregg, Appropriateness of
Imposing Common Carrier Status on Natural Gas Pipelines, 4 ENERGY L.J. 155 (1983); Tye, Com-
petitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J.
337 (1987).
19. The Department of Justice conducted an extensive investigation and concluded that certain
airline-owned computer reservations systems were or could be used to foreclose competition in the
airline industry. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking-Computer Reservations Systems,
CAB Docket No. 41,686 (Nov. 1983) (Comments and Proposed Rules of the Department of Justice).
These conclusions led the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to implement rules that were designed to
"deal with competitive abuses and consumer injury" such as discrimination, tying, bias, and impeding
objective service information. Carrier-Owned Computer, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,540-64 (1984)
(codified at 14 C.F.R § 255 (1987)).
20. See Tye, Post-Merger Denials of Competitive Access and Trackage Rights in the Rail Indus-
try, 53 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 413 (1986); Tye, Preserving Postmerger Rail Competition Via the Parity
Principle, 26 TRANSP. J. 39 (1986).
21. Statement of Baumol & Willig, supra note 7, at 25.
22. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 1 (1982); see also W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 476-83 (1982); Baumol & Willig, Contestability: De-
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contestable market . . . under certain entry and exit conditions, the pres-
ence of potential competition can generate performance that maximizes
market welfare.""3 Under this approach, the apparent task of regulators
in the transition is to remove impediments to contestability in order to
permit movement toward the welfare ideal of a perfectly contestable mar-
ket. These policy prescriptions have gained some recognition outside the
economics literature, particularly at the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC).
Specifically, two important pricing recommendations for the rail indus-
try have been offered: 4 Carriers should engage in Ramsey Pricing2" to
achieve revenue sufficiency while sacrificing a minimum of economic effi-
ciency in customers' use of facilities, and these Ramsey prices should be
constrained only by overall revenue adequacy 6 or a Stand-Alone Cost
(SAC) test,2 7 whichever is the lower.
velopments Since the Book, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 9 (Supp. 1986).
23. Morrison & Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the Contestability Hypothesis, 30
J.L. & ECON. 53, 54 (1987).
24. See Baumol & Willig, Pricing Issues in the Deregulation of Railroad Rates, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF REGULATED MARKETS 11 (J. Finsinger ed. 1983); see generally Baumol, Minimum
and Maximum Pricing Principles for Residual Regulation, 5 E. ECON. J. 235, 235-48 (1979);
Statement of Baumol & Willig, supra note 7, at 7. Baumol and Willig were joined in their support
for the Commission's SAC test by 14 other prominent economists, including George Stigler, Almarin
Phillips, Kenneth Arrow, Elizabeth Bailey, and Ann Friedlaender. Verified Statement of Economists
Supporting The Principles of Constrained Market Pricing at 5-8, Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide,
Ex Parte No, 347 (Sub-No. 1), 1 I.C.C.2d 520, 542-46 (1985).
25. Ramsey Pricing, a variant of value of service pricing, sets the highest rates for the most
demand-inelastic traffic. More formally, the markup of price over marginal cost (sometimes measured
by the revenue to variable cost ratio) is inversely related to the elasticity of demand, which is the ratio
of the percentage change in quantity divided by a (supposedly causal) percentage change in price.
Where the regulated firm produces substitutes and complements, these relationships are evaluated by
more complex versions of the pricing rule. See Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37
ECON. J. 47 (1927), for development of the basic theory in the context of minimizing the economic
burden of imposing taxes when demand and supply elasticities are known to differ across economic
activities; see also Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Rail-
way and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938) for extension of Ramsey's basic idea to justify
differential pricing for railroads and other public utilities; Baumol, Bonbright, Brozen, Dean, Ed-
wards, Hoover, Pegrum, Roberts & Williams, The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad
Services, 35 J. Bus. 357, 357 (1962), for a discussion of the relevant cost concept which is pertinent to
Ramsey pricing; and Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 265 (1970), for the seminal work developing the theoretical formulas for establishing
Ramsey prices for a regulated utility with known revenue requirement, demand functions, and margi-
nal costs; see generally Verified Statements of William J. Baumol, Robert D. Willig, and Stephen
Goldfield, Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, Ex Parte No. 347 (Sub-No. 1), 1 I.C.C.2d 520 (1985);
Verified Statements of Kenneth Arrow, Leon N. Moses, Ronald R. Braeutigam, and William
Wecker, id.; cf. Levin & Strain, Nursing the Railroads Back to Health, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct.
1981, at 29, for a proposal to apply Ramsey pricing principles to railroads in an actual application.
26. See McFarland, Did Railroad Deregulation Lead to Monopoly Pricing? An Application of q,
60 J. Bus. 385 (1987).
27. A SAC test stipulates that prices should never exceed the levels that would be charged by a
specialized stand-alone competitor producing only a subset of the regulated firm's services. See Willig
& Baumol, Using Competition as a Guide, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 28. Shippers have com-
plained that the particular form of the SAC test offered by proponents would, as a practical matter,
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1. Ramsey Pricing
In its simplest form, Ramsey Pricing starts with the principle that reg-
ulators should set prices maximizing consumers' surplus, the difference
between the customers' maximum willingness to pay and the actual rate.
It assumes that demand for each service is dependent only on the rate for
that service and is independent of the rates set for other regulated services.
The resulting Inverse Elasticity Rule (IER) determines a set of prices for
each of the services of the firm such that the firm's overall revenue re-
quirement is achieved and the cost of raising this revenue is minimized
where cost is measured in terms of aggregate lost consumers' surplus (ig-
noring in this simple form changes in producers' surplus). Each price is
set such that the percentage contribution of net revenue for each output
above marginal cost is inversely related to its demand elasticity.
Ramsey Pricing has a long history in ratemaking practice. The closely
related concept of charging what the market will bear has an instinctive
appeal to the regulated firm because it affords an opportunity to earn high
profit margins on captive volume while meeting competition in other mar-
kets. The United States Postal Service, for example, has justified a high
markup over incremental cost for First Class mail on the grounds that it
is protected from competition in this service by the Private Express Stat-
utes but can charge only a low markup for parcel services where it faces
intense competition."8
Prescriptions of Ramsey Pricing policy for railroad regulators are based
on two important assumptions about that industry. The first is that the
industry is subject to substantial economies of scale or scope.2 If so, the
theory states that revenue adequacy requires prices well in excess of the
relevant marginal or variable costs to recover a substantial body of joint or
never actually restrain rail rates, and supporters of the test have argued that the need for regulatory
intervention in individual cases is minimal so long as the rail carrier is revenue-inadequate overall.
See Reply Verified Statement of Robert D. Willig at 8, 38-39, Mobil Chem. Co. v. Seaboard Sys.
R.R., Inc., No. 37,850S (I.C.C. Sept. 18, 1984); Statement of Baumol & Willig, supra note 7, at 4,
9-10, 32, 69. Furthermore, one of the principal proponents of the test has asserted that the rail
industry operates in a contestable market because of the ready availability of motor carriers and water
carriers supplying almost identical (or even superior) services at comparable incremental costs. For the
exposition of these theories, see Verified Statement of William J. Baumol, Santa Fe S. Pac.
Corp.-Control-S. Pac. Transp. Co.: Merger-the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co. and S.
Pac. Transp. Co., Fin. No. 30,400 (March 1984); see also Anderson & Rennicke, The Contestable
Market Defense: Measuring Competition on Freight Transportation, 54 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 199
(1987).
28. See Waverman, Pricing Principles: How Should Postal Rates be Set?, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSTAL SERVICE IssuES 7 (R. Sherman ed. 1980).
29. In the theory of multiproduct monopoly, economies of scale exist when pricing at marginal
costs does not produce revenue adequacy. Economies of scope result where a single firm can produce
multiple outputs more cheaply than a combination of firms specializing in each of the prod-
ucts-usually because of the presence of joint costs.
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common costs that are not assignable to any particular traffic. The second
assumption is that the revenue adequacy of the incumbent carriers should
be a major, if not the highest, goal of regulators. 0 In essence, then, the
goal of revenue adequacy can be achieved only by some sort of discrimina-
tory pricing scheme, such as Ramsey Pricing.
2. Problems of Ramsey Pricing
These assumptions can create a paradox for regulators during transi-
tion to less regulation. This is perhaps best understood by considering the
status of mainstream economic theory prior to the entrance of contestabil-
ity theory. That conventional theory was largely concerned with the two
ends of the competitive spectrum: the perfect competitor pricing at margi-
nal cost and the price discriminating monopolist. 1 In between were mo-
nopolistic competition and oligopoly, usually analyzed under different as-
sumptions concerning recognized interdependencies.
Ramsey Pricing policies were initially designed to permit a mul-
tiproduct monopoly firm to price above marginal cost to achieve a revenue
requirement at a minimum social cost relative to marginal cost pricing. As
long as competition was restricted, Ramsey Pricing minimized the static
welfare costs of that restraint. According to conventional economic theory,
at least before the arrival of contestability theory, the Ramsey Pricing
model was of primary interest to a firm when it and its regulators were
seeking guidance on how best to exercise discretion over price. Prices in
excess of marginal costs, particularly if they were differentiated or dis-
criminatory, usually are assumed to signify less than perfect competition.
This feature would seem to limit the applicability of Ramsey Pricing as
an invisible hand replacing traditional regulatory rate setting.3 2
The theory of multiproduct industry structure and sustainability analy-
sis provided an economic efficiency rationale for preserving the large mul-
tiproduct monopoly as an institution. Some constraint, however, is needed
on the firm's power to earn monopoly profits or otherwise to abuse its
position as an incumbent supplier. The needed discipline was seemingly
30. On the importance of this revenue adequacy objective, see Baumol & Willig, supra note 24, at
15:
One of the most crucial of the tasks that is assigned to prices is that they yield total revenues
sufficiently large to cover production costs. This component of efficiency in pricing can perhaps
be considered to be of overriding importance . . . . Under this philosophy there is an impor-
tant sense in which the opportunity for financial viability for the supplier is the matter of
highest priority. It is a condition absolutely necessary ....
31. This theory goes back to Ramsey, Boiteux, and Dupuit, among others.
32. See Baumol, Bailey & Willig, Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Mul-
tiproduct Natural Monopoly, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 350 (1977).
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provided if markets were contestable. The theory of contestability thus
was offered as a single "standard of welfare-maximizing structure and
behavior""3 that would span the spectrum of industry cost structures from
constant returns to increasing returns and from single product to
multiproduct.
A paradox arises because a welfare-maximizing monopolist that is sub-
ject to rate of return regulation and restrictions on entry will have availa-
ble to it Ramsey efficient price sets that are denied to the contestable mo-
nopolist. Movements toward perfect contestability are not unambiguously
welfare enhancing in the static efficiency world of Ramsey Pricing because
removal of constraints on contestability may eliminate the possibility of
Ramsey efficient prices that would be feasible in a less than perfectly con-
testable market. 4 Endorsement of Ramsey Pricing and revenue adequacy
as the principal goal of regulators thus can have profound implications for
competitive policies during the transition. Specifically, these recommenda-
tions have been invoked to support policies that suppress competition via
foreclosures of competitive access and to encourage mergers to the degree
necessary to facilitate the Ramsey Pricing believed essential to revenue
adequacy. 5
To a considerable extent, regulators are being asked to choose between
using Ramsey Pricing to achieve the goal of revenue adequacy and having
regulation serve as a surrogate for competition unimpeded by entry barri-
ers, thus allowing movements toward greater contestability. A high degree
of contestability would appear to be an arbitrary assumption or contri-
vance for many regulated industries (even though at least somewhat plau-
sible, though not totally verifiable, for an example of substantial interest
at the time the theory was promulgated, that of airline deregulation)."'
What eventually emerged, nevertheless, was almost a general justification
for a permissive regulatory posture toward even a multiproduct monopoly
that faces little or no immediate competition from other incumbents. 7
Understandably, the theory was well received by firms in a variety of
33. Baumol, supra note 22, at 2.
34. See Braeutigam, Optimal Pricing with Intermodal Competition, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 38
(1979) (showing that Ramsey Pricing justifies extending regulation to cover competing suppliers
"even if those modes serve markets which are potentially quite competitive"); see also Phillips, Ram-
sey Pricing and Sustainability with Interdependent Demands, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUB-
LIC ENTERPRISE 187 (B. Mitchell & P. Kleindorfer eds. 1979). It may be useful to think of the world
as a monopoly amusement park, see Oi, A Disneyworld Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey
Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q.J. ECON. 77 (1971).
35. See Verified Statement & Reply Verified Statement of William J. Baumol and Robert D.
Willig, Intramodal Rail Competition, Ex Parte No. 445 (Sub-No. 1), 1 I.C.C.2d 822 (1985).
36. See E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 153-71 (1985);
Bailey & Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1981).
37. Contestable Markets, supra note 7, at 111-12.
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industries seeking to be deregulated. 8 Surprisingly, in a few cases, the
theory has also captured the imagination of permissive regulators seeking
to relinquish their duties during the transition, despite the fact that the
relevant markets could hardly be labelled perfectly contestable. 9
The Ramsey Pricing proposal has also been criticized both because of
the practical infeasibility of applying the pricing algorithms4" and the fail-
ure of the pricing rule to protect some so-called captive consumers who
were granted statutory safeguards against "unreasonable rates""' during
the transition. The SAC test has also been criticized as being simply a
necessary, but not a sufficient, surrogate test for competition in a regime
of contestable markets."2 The danger, however, is that the theory's pre-
scriptions for public policy in the transition to deregulation will become
nothing less than an atavism of pricing and entry policies under regula-
tion.43 Indeed, Ramsey Pricing has long been tempting as a rationaliza-
tion for regulators cross-subsidizing uneconomic lines of business,"' and
free entry has long been perceived by regulators as a threat to these dis-
criminatory pricing schemes.
In the case of both regulation and the transition, a tendency can thus
arise to consider substantial price discrimination as consonant with an ide-
alized welfare norm.'" At the same time, the severe deviations from a
38. See id.
39. See Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, Ex Pane No. 347 (I.C.C. Feb. 8, 1983). Of course,
perfect contestability may not be needed to maintain some semblance of competitive threat which
would be sufficient to exert a downward pressure on prices. See Morrison & Winston, supra note 23,
at 58.
40. Tye & Leonard, On the Problems of Applying Ramsey Pricing to the Railroad Industry with
Uncertain Demand Elasticities, 17A TRANSP. RES. 439, 444-45 (1983); see also Tye, The Pricing
Policy of the Postal Service: Policymaking Misunderstood, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256
(1985); Tye, The Postal Service: Economics Made Simplistic, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 62
(1983); Tye, Ironies to the Application of the Inverse Elasticity Rule to the Pricing of U.S. Postal
Services, 19 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 245 (1983).
41. Allen & Berardino, The Application of Ramsey Pricing in the Railroad Industry, 25
TRANSP. RES. F. 204, 204-13 (1984); Tye, Ramsey Pricing and Market Dominance Under the Stag-
gers Rail Act of 1980, 24 TRANSP. RES. F. 667, 667-74 (1983); Tye, Balancing the Ratemaking
Goals of the Staggers Rail Act, 22 TRANSP. J. 17 (1983).
42. See Tye, Stand-Alone Costs as an Indicator of Market Dominance and Rate Reasonableness
under the Staggers Rail Act, 13 INT'L J. TRANSP. ECON. 21 (1986); Tye, Problems of Applying
Stand-Alone Costs as an Indicator of Market Dominance and Rail Rate Reasonableness, 12 INT'L
J. TRANSP. ECON. 7 (1985); see also Weiss, Nitzan & Lee, Sustainability of the Multiproduct Mo-
nopoly and Ramsey-Optimal Pricing, 142 J. THEORETICAL ECON. 473 (1986) (showing that SAC
test is not necessary and sufficient condition for sustainable contestable monopolist and thus cannot
serve as surrogate for contestability).
43. The argument that revenue adequacy is threatened by procompetitive policies resurrects the
oldest debate in railroad regulatory policy. For an extensive review of the debate and its antecedents,
see Locklin, The Literature on Railway Rate Theory, 47 Q.J. ECON. 167 (1933).
44. Inability to abandon uneconomic branchlines and unprofitable passenger service have com-
monly been cited as examples in the rail industry. See Levin, Regulation, Barriers to Exit, and the
Investment Behavior of Railroads, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 181 (G. Fromm ed. 1981).
45. See Breen, Antitrust and Price Discrimination in the Trucking Industry, 28 ANTITRUST
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highly competitive or contestable environment-such as restrictions on en-
try, franchised monopoly, cross-subsidies, or sunk costs-that facilitated
the price discrimination and restricted the options of those disadvantaged
by it are forgotten.46 In the particular case of railroads, moreover, Ramsey
Pricing and the SAC test fail as transition mechanisms because the SAC
test starts with an artificial attempt to force the transition problem into
the mold of contestability theory in an industry where, according to most
observations, "hit and run" entry by specialized competitors with cost
structures identical to the incumbent is somewhat limited.47 Indeed, if far
more competitive and easy-to-enter transport markets, such as trucking
and airlines, do not achieve full contestability, '4 8 then the difficult-to-enter
railroad market should fall significantly short of that ideal.
B. The Implications of Sunk Costs
The enduring contribution of contestable markets theory is likely to be
its focus on sunk costs, which previously had been inadequately explored
by economists on the ground that, once sunk, costs are irrelevant to
BULL. 201, 220-25 (1983); Frank, When Are Price Differentials Discriminatory? 2 J. POL'Y ANALY-
SIS & MGMT. 238 (1983). Some observers have characterized price discrimination as an attribute of
competitive markets. See Beilock, Is Regulation Necessary for Value of Service Pricing?, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 93 (1985). The problem started when proponents of airline deregulation argued that competi-
tive forces would undermine the departures from long-run incremental cost pricing that were believed
to have arisen from the cross-subsidies induced by regulation. When competition resulted in price
structures that appeared to depart at least as far from long-run incremental costs, some proponents of
deregulation lost confidence in their own case and asserted that demand rather than cost was the
primary determinant of prices under competition. An alternative explanation would be that these
departures are a legacy of the uneconomic investments induced by regulatory incentives rather than a
permanent feature of competitive markets. See Schwieterman, Fare is Fair in Airline Deregula-
tion-The Decline of Price Discrimination, REGULATION, July-Aug. 1985, at 32.
46. Price discrimination usually implies some departure from the norms of perfect competition
and is unsustainable against intense competition among incumbents. See Benson, On the Ability of
Spatial Competitors to Price Discriminate, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 251 (1984). Product differentiation
and the transaction costs which accompany customers' efforts to evade the price discrimination are two
sufficient conditions for the existence of discriminatory pricing even with free entry. See Borenstein,
Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON. 380 (1985).
47. Ramsey Pricing is alleged to be necessary because of the large pool of costs that cannot be
assigned to any particular class of traffic. But if this is true, then a specialized hypothetical new
entrant will always suffer an economy-of-scope entry barrier. Efforts to eliminate the scale disadvan-
tages to the hypothetical new entrant by giving it the advantages of the incumbent only delay, rather
than eliminate, the original cost allocation problem.
48. Many observers have suggested this. See E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note
36, at 165; S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 64
(1986) (arguing that structure of aviation industry represents "a combination of some version of the
dominant firm model and imperfect contestability"); Call & Keeler, Airline Deregulation, Fares and
Market Behavior: Some Empirical Evidence, in ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORT ECONOMICS
221, 244-45 (1985); Shepherd, Contestability vs. Competition, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 572, 584-85
(1984); Graham, Kaplan & Sibley, Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry, 14 BELL J.
ECON. 118 (1983); Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy and
Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 405-08 (1987). But see Contestable Markets, supra note 7, at
127-34 (arguing that aviation and trucking industries closely approximate perfect contestability).
Competition Via Contractual Equilibrium
decision-making about future costs and benefits. Contestability theory cor-
rectly stresses that it is precisely this foreclosure of future options caused
by sunk costs that generates risk for entrants and gives incumbents the
power to make credible threats to deter entry. In short, the contestability
focus on sunk costs leads to the conclusion that risks can arise from the
irreversibility of certain decisions.
While making sellers' sunk costs the centerpiece of their new theory,
the practitioners of contestability theory have, ironically, ignored the
equally important implications of buyers' sunk costs for public policy dur-
ing the transition to deregulation. In essence, when vertically related firms
sink costs into specialized investments that are idiosyncratic to the rela-
tionship, the resulting quasi-rents can be appropriable by opportunistic
behavior designed to change the income shares specified by the original
terms of the relationship.49 Highly discriminatory Ramsey Pricing during
the transition could be interpreted as a potential example of such opportu-
nistic behavior, often being crucially dependent on the existence of sunk
costs. Indeed, quite perversely, a purported inadequacy of enough buyers
with enough sunk costs could even become the rationale for suppressing
contestability to achieve revenue adequacy.
The long-run equilibrium implicit in Ramsey Pricing and the SAC test
is likely to be a system of rather extreme price discrimination to be en-
forced principally by the constraints on buyers' choices that sunk costs
provide.5 ° Any such power to engage in price discrimination is, however,
illusory, or temporary at best, because sunk costs are usually transitory.
Even in the short run, statistical studies of demand elasticities show large
errors that impose difficulties in making the necessary distinctions.5 In
the long run, the frustrating history of value of service 52 rate making, pro-
pounded by regulators and systematically undermined by markets, 53 is el-
oquent testimony to the impermanence of any set of demand elasticities.
49. For a discussion of the role of sunk costs in creating short-term monopoly power to extract
both economic rents and quasi-rents, see Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropri-
able Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978).
50. The ICC, in endorsing Ramsey Pricing and proposing the SAC test, specifically identified the
difference between oil-fired and coal-fired electrical generating costs as an apparently permanent
source of economic rent that could be appropriated by the rail industry as the answer to rail revenue
adequacy. See Zimmerman, Rent and Regulation in Unit-Train Rate Determination, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 271 (1979).
51. See Tye & Leonard, supra note 40, at 441.
52. "Value of service" is a term usually connoting ratemaking methodologies that attempt to ac-
count for differering elasticities, but without the theoretical elegance or quantitative precision of the
Ramsey Pricing approach.
53. See J. MEYER, R. WILSON, M. BAUGHCUM, E. BURTON & L. CAOUETTE, THE ECONOMICS
OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 75-109 (1980); J. MEYER, M. PECK,
J. STENASON & C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUS-
TRIES 242-74 (1959).
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No carrier should therefore expect to achieve permanent revenue ade-
quacy by confiscating quasi-rents resulting from temporarily sunk costs.
Disadvantaged shippers will relocate to areas where they have access to
the same lower rates as their competitors or will refuse to sink additional
costs without long-term rate guarantees. Substitutes will be found, in the
form of new products or materials, or in new sources of supply, or en-
tirely new transportation systems, such as trucks in place of railroads in
the first half of the twentieth century and railroads in place of canals,
barges, and riverboats in the nineteenth century. The composition of traf-
fic carried by the price-discriminating carrier also will change over time,
almost inevitably tilting toward so-called lower-rated traffic, traffic carry-
ing smaller markups over costs.
Therefore, it may only be a slight exaggeration to suggest that, without
government intervention, in the long run all market relationships are con-
testable, at least in the sense of being renegotiable and redefinable. One
could almost state it as an extension of the Coase theorem: If regulation
results in what people perceive to be inefficiently high mark-ups over
costs, then they will pursue other alternatives and negotiate until they
achieve what they perceive to be a more efficient outcome.5
The sustainability literature accompanying contestability theory com-
monly has focused on the incumbents' short-run defenses against the po-
tential entrant, so as to maintain Ramsey Pricing,"8 while ignoring the
countermeasures available to buyers to evade price discrimination. These
buyer defenses cause the elasticities of the various classes of output or
traffic to converge; the elasticities also increase substantially over time, and
through product competition cross-elasticities can become much more sub-
stantial. Unless there are true economic rents captured or created by the
pricing structure, not just temporary quasi-rents resulting from sunk
costs,5" the result is the near impossibility of sustaining in the long run the
high degree of discrimination possible in the short run because of buyers'
sunk costs.
As a consequence, Ramsey Pricing in practice is often either a contri-
vance of a regulated market environment," a monopoly,5 8 or a transitory
54. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that economic actors
will attempt to negotiate to achieve efficient allocation of resources despite legal rules which produce
inefficient initial allocation).
55. See Baumol, Bailey & Willig, supra note 32.
56. See Damus, Two Part Tariffs and Optimum Taxation: The Case of Railway Rates, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 65 (1981); Friedman, In Defense of the Long-Haul/Short-Haul Discrimination, 10
BELL J. ECON. 706 (1979); Tye, On the Effectiveness of Product and Geographic Competition in
Determining Rail Market Dominance, 24 TRANSP. J. 5 (1984).
57. See Boyer, Equalizing Discrimination and Cartel Pricing in Transport Rate Regulation, 89
J. PoL.. ECON. 270 (1981); Trotter, The Price-Discriminating Public Enterprise, With Special Refer-
ence to British Rail, 19 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 41 (1985).
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feature based on the temporarily sunk costs of certain participants, leading
to degrees of price discrimination that cannot be sustained in the long run
in a fully competitive deregulated equilibrium. Moreover, suppliers may
be encouraged to sink additional costs in the belief that a highly discrimi-
natory Ramsey Pricing scheme enforced by costs sunk in the prior regula-
tory regime is a permanent feature of the marketplace."9 Some price dis-
crimination may well persist, of course, for some time but not in the
substantial degree permitted by a carryover of regulation-induced sunk
costs.
C. The Anticompetitive Results of the Revenue Adequacy Focus
Combining an implicit belief in the incompatibility of intramodal com-
petition and revenue adequacy with a highly motivated search by disad-
vantaged customers for alternatives, a propitious environment is not cre-
ated for a successful transition to deregulation. The goals of capacity
rationalization and revenue adequacy will continue to be frustrated and
carriers, shippers, and regulators may each decide to abandon any com-
mitment to deregulation. The major danger is that the inability to achieve
revenue adequacy under Ramsey Pricing will frustrate the transition to
deregulation by fostering the impression among regulators that revenue
adequacy is necessarily and intrinsically incompatible with procompetitive
goals. While this outcome may or may not be true depending on the par-
ticular case, and is provable only when a new equilibrium is established,
it is only one more step to endorse whatever additional restrictions on
competition are necessary to achieve the goal of immediate revenue ade-
quacy above all else.
In general, the premise that the revenue needs of incumbents are the
highest priority of regulators is not likely to be a tenable basis for a work-
58. Given the assumed cost structure of the rail industry, revenue-adequate Ramsey Pricing is not
sustainable against direct intramodal competition among incumbents with identical cost structures and
can be practiced only by a firm that can disregard the pricing response of identically situated incum-
bents. This fact should be evident from observing that two incumbents with identical cost structures
cannot both set their rate structures based on determinate mutual estimates of elasticities formed by
the competitive threat of the other incumbent. This, together with that fact that most traffic moves on
joint rates, means that there is a serious question as to whether Ramsey Pricing can even be practiced
in the rail industry unless the carrier is freed from intramodal competition and the constraints of the
antitrust laws. See Damus, supra note 56, at 74-79; Damus, Ramsey Pricing by U.S. Railroads: Can
It Exist?, 18 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL. 51 (1984); Damus, An Evaluation of Ramsey Pricing:
Argentine Railways ca. 1905, 24 TRANSP. REs. F. 418 (1983).
59. Katz has pointed out that "price discrimination also may affect the costs incurred to produce a
given level of total output." Katz, Price Discrimination and Monopolistic Competition, 52
ECONOMETRICA 1453, 1453 (1984). Indeed, the history of the transportation industries has been
largely influenced by the creation of competitive alternatives, many of them involving what has be-
come known as uneconomic bypass, to evade the price discrimination fostered by faith in price dis-
crimination as an answer to a regulated carrier's problems.
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able transition to deregulation. If an industry already approaches substan-
tial contestability, revenue adequacy of incumbents should, as a matter of
logic, carry little weight in the choice of policy. Even if an industry is not
contestable, sunk costs existing at the onset of deregulation are almost
surely an erroneous standard for assessing future revenue needs. Indeed, if
past investment patterns were a reliable basis for future revenue needs, a
major rationale for deregulation would be invalidated. While the sunk
costs of past investments cannot be totally ignored, an exclusively
backward-looking view of revenue needs, based on costs sunk under the
prior regulatory regime, will provide little basis for establishing priorities
for future regulatory policies.
Concerns over revenue adequacy also originate in assumptions about
industry cost structure, assumptions that may owe more to prior regula-
tion than to technology or economics. The assumption of strong economies
of scale and the existence of a large pool of costs that cannot be attributed
to a particular traffic or business can become the basis for the belief that
prices must exceed incremental costs, and therefore that revenue adequacy
and intramodal competition are not compatible. Scale economies com-
monly derive from some form of indivisibility in an underutilized resource
or factor of production.6" As noted above, regulation often encouraged in-
vestment in excess capacity, which must be squeezed out during the tran-
sition to deregulation. The existence of underutilized capacity in an indus-
try with very substantial and long-lived sunk costs can therefore easily be
confused with true scale economies, that is underutilized resources that
arise from indivisibilities (fixed costs) which are a permanent feature of
the technology of the industry. One cannot necessarily infer that an indus-
try in disequilibrium with excess capacity, where prices are equal to mar-
ginal or average variable costs and produce inadequate revenues, must
necessarily be subject to long-run scale economies. The industry's
revenue-adequacy problems might just as well be solved by a restructuring
of the industry's market relationships, for example via long-term contracts
as discussed below or by a restructuring of its cost structure as by schemes
of price discrimination based on current cost structures. 61
IV. An Alternative Vision of the Transition
If regulators are to fashion their policies with the goal of a successful
transition to deregulation in mind, a new set of explicit regulatory policies
60. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, in MICROECONOMICS:
SELECTED READINGS 188, 204-05 (E. Mansfield ed. 1971).
61. This observation may be of particular relevance to current disputes about appropriate access
charges for local telephones.
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may be needed. Toward that end, the following policy guidelines are
suggested:
1. Incentives for efficiency and innovation via reliance on competitive
forces should be pursued vigorously and incumbents should feel
strong pressures from actual and potential competitors to squeeze
out the inflated costs that commonly become associated with regu-
lated industries;
2. Contracts should be encouraged to protect buyers and sellers from
extreme forms of opportunistic behavior, for example, substantial
departures from the regulatory status quo ante immediately after
deregulation as these opportunities arise from sunk costs, long-lived
assets, and buyer/seller relationships established under
regulation; 62
3. Prices and services should be unbundled" wherever necessary to
promote competition during the transition, to encourge new entry,
and to eliminate cross-subsidies;
4. Some residual but strictly phased and limited regulation should be
employed where contracts or competition will not quickly supplant
prior regulatory contracts or where some network bottlenecks per-
sist. The appropriate mix of these ingredients will depend on the
degree to which the regulated industry is characterized by large
sunk costs, economies of scale, and small numbers of competitors. 4
62. Of course, transportation services in a competitive market would be sold with a mixture of
contract, publicly posted ("tariff"), and spot prices, depending on the needs of shippers and carriers.
See T. HEAVER & J. NELSON, RAILWAY PRICING UNDER COMMERCIAL FREEDOM: THE CANADIAN
EXPERIENCE 63-105 (1977); Lacoste, The Structure of Railroad Fares and Rates in a Highly Com-
petitive Freight Transportation Market, in ECONOMIC REGULATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES
R. NELSON 83 (K. Boyer & W. Shepherd eds. 1981).
63. Adams & Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475
(1976).
64. Baumol notes that markets and contracts will not automatically achieve efficiency under cir-
cumstances of "asset specificity (sunk costs), limits on information and calculation ability ('bounded
rationality'), and willingness to profit at the expense of others ('opportunism')." Baumol, William-
son's "The Economic Institution of Capitalism," 17 RAND J. ECON. 279, 280 (1986). For a discus-
sion of the types of institutions that have developed in the absence of regulation to deal with these
problems, see 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 163-364 (1985);
Phillips, Schwinn Rules and the "New Economics" of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 573
(1975); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transac-
tion Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979); Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust:
Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974).
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A. The Need for Efficiency
The maximum reliance on competitive pressures in the first guideline
coalesces with the discouragement of extreme forms of quasi-rent-seeking
(opportunistic) behavior in the second. Firms going through the regulatory
transition should not be encouraged to believe that opportunistic behavior
that exploits costs sunk under prior regulatory rules are a substitute for
the true efficiency gains in capacity reduction, cost minimizing, and mar-
keting arrangements to be sought from deregulation. For some time it has
been recognized that regulation can be a form of contract that permits
buyer and seller to sink costs and thereby become captive to one another. 6
A major task of deregulation is to supplant this regulatory contract with
private contracts to recover sunk costs while discouraging opportunistic
behavior."6 The long-run model for regulators to seek during the transi-
tion, therefore, should be a contractual equilibrium in which shippers and
carriers and sellers and buyers establish the terms of the agreement before
they sink costs.67
B. A Contractual Approach
The place to begin in developing appropriate regulatory rules during
the transition to deregulation is therefore to ask what kind of contracts
would have already been in place had private-market contractual institu-
tions, rather than regulation, 8 performed these functions historically-if a
65. The idea originates in Coase's pathbreaking work. Coase, supra note 54. But see Goldberg,
Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976). For an intriguing demonstra-
tion that procedures for resolving similar "sunk costs" issues must be developed for intrafirm relation-
ships, see Fitzroy & Mueller, Cooperation and Conflict in Contractual Organizations, 24 Q. REV.
ECON. & Bus. 24 (1984).
66. Section 208 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 amended the law by creating Section 10,713 to
the Interstate Commerce Act. See Railroad Transportation Contracts, Ex Parte No. 387, 367 I.C.C. 9
(1982), corrected, 367 I.C.C. 397 (1983); Uggin, Railroad Contract Rates: A Working Analysis of
Sections 10713, 48 INTERSTATE COM. COMMISSION PRAC. J. 526, 526 (1981). Such contracts had
an uncertain legal status under the prior law. See R. DART, CONTRACTING FOR COAL TRANSPORTA-
TION (1982); Altrogge, Railroad Contracts and Competitive Conditions, 21 TRANSP. J. 37 (1981).
67. In posing the contractual equilibrium as one of particular interest, we do not mean to pre-
clude consideration of other regimes. For other suggestions or procedures for recovering sunk or fixed
costs, see French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J. Bus.
417 (1984); Mohring, Profit Maximization, Cost Minimization, and Pricing for Congestion-Prone
Facilities, 21 LoGIsTIcs & TRANSP. REV. 27 (1985); Oren, Smith & Wilson, Capacity Pricing, 53
ECONOMETRICA 545 (1985).
68. Coase's original contribution was to note that the efficiency rationale for regulatory and legal
intervention into disputes arises from the presence of transaction costs-the cost of negotiating and
enforcing contracts that foreclose efficient contracts from solving these disputes. If the original ration-
ale for regulatory intervention is no longer valid, the purpose of the proposed thought experiment is to
imagine the kinds of efficient contracts that would have been negotiated in the absence of regulatory
intervention.
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Coase approach to these problems had been pursued rather than
regulation.
A variety of possible or plausible contractual outcomes consistent with
an unregulated negotiating or contracting process can be identified. Regu-
lators would have to judge among them based on achieving a reasonably
"equitable" transition from the regulatory rules understood when the par-
ties sunk their costs, incentives for efficiency, deterrence of opportunistic
behavior, and contribution to the goal of a successful transition to deregu-
lation. Some acceptable possibilities involve some continuing price dis-
crimination, perhaps within ever wider bounds (as stipulated, for exam-
ple, in the Staggers Act), but would probably rule out highly
discriminatory Ramsey Pricing based on short-run opportunistic behavior
on the grounds that this would have potentially adverse consequences for
achieving a successful transition to deregulation.
In general, much of what is conventionally called "price discrimina-
tion" might be expected to persist even after deregulation, especially in
transportation industries where almost every haul or trip between a given
origin and destination or city pair is likely to have unique characteristics.
The important point is that any such discrimination should not be based
on regulatory constraints, or overtly opportunistic exploitation of a transi-
tory situation bequeathed by previous regulation. Rather it should be a
consequence that evolves from market forces or mutually acceptable con-
tracts (always subject to further competitive and technological challenge).
The potential welfare advantages of such open market-devised discrimina-
tion have long been recognized."
1. Changes Under a Contractual Approach
Experience with the general use of contracts in the economy suggests
some of the relevant features of a long-run contractual equilibrium. For
example, through-put agreements and take-or-pay contracts"0 are often
signed in transportation industries precisely to shift risk of revenue vari-
ances away from the suppliers who have sunk costs in the right-of-way to
the suppliers of the operating services or shippers who are presumably
more knowledgeable about their future demands or are better able to bear
the risks.
69. See Ekelund, Jules Dupuit and the Early Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 462 (1968); Friedman, supra note 56, at 706.
70. A through-put agreement is a term of art in an oil pipeline agreement whereby shippers agree
to pay for their share of the pipeline expense whether or not they use their share of capacity. More
generally in contract terminology, "take-or-pay" refers to a commitment of a buyer to accept delivery
or pay anyway regardless of future market conditions, with excused nonperformance depending on the
particular terms of the contract.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Thus, suppose that there are ten oil-drilling or mining companies with
projections of demand for use of a new railway or pipeline. Prior to con-
struction, the existence of a competitive market for coal or petroleum
reserves would preclude any extreme discriminatory rate structure from
emerging. The option of the shippers to construct their own facility, which
is a common solution in the case of oil pipelines and an occasional one for
railroads, means that the contract price of capacity should approximate
long-run average costs even in the presence of long-run declining costs
because competition among sellers will usually succeed in preventing any
extreme sorts of price discrimination recommended by the Ramsey Pricing
approach." As distinguished from this long-term contract price, a spot
price will reflect short-run costs, demand, and competitive alternatives,
and will sometimes differ significantly from the long-term contract price.
Nevertheless, the ability to subdivide the indivisibility of the single facility
through contracts with numerous competitive and approximately equally
advantaged suppliers should mean that long-term contract prices all
roughly equal long-run average cost.
A more difficult issue is raised in the case where all suppliers are not
equally advantaged. This would happen when they are spaced equally
along the line so that economic rents would be created for resource owners
who are closer to the end market if the rate per ton-mile is constant. Eco-
nomically efficient Ramsey Pricing schemes applied by competitive carri-
ers operating under increasing returns to shippers with substantial true
economic rents available to finance the carriers' revenue requirements
cannot be rejected in such circumstances.
Work by Sylvester Damus72 and going back to David Ricardo,78 sug-
gests that a discriminatory rate scheme could be devised to capture these
economic rents in order to move toward marginal cost pricing of the trans-
portation system. As long as the rate discrimination captured economic
rents created by the transportation facility itself, the theory says that the
discrimination might not be avoidable by shippers and would be more
efficient than a nondiscriminatory rate structure. In effect, such a rate
scheme is the device a single firm would employ if it were developing the
transportation facility with the objective of covering its costs and maximiz-
ing the rental value of the adjacent land. The amount of discrimination
71. When capacity is widely owned and in some cases is assignable, one could imagine that a
competitive market could emerge even though only one facility exists. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline, for
example, is owned by numerous separate interests which can be bought and sold. This contracting
procedure for dealing with sunk costs and economies of scale has been dubbed the condominium
model. See Hogan, The Boundaries Between Regulation and Competition, in DRAWING THE LINE
ON NATURAL GAS REGULATION 75 (J. Kalt & F. Schuller eds. 1987).
72. Damus, supra note 56, at 70.
73. D. RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817).
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needed would depend directly on the degree of scale economies (determin-
ing the amount to be raised).
By contrast, suppliers in regulated industries have often sunk substan-
tial amounts based on an understanding that these costs would be amor-
tized via the regulatory contract or process.74 During the transition to de-
regulation, a problem may arise because under certain circumstances sunk
capacity costs cannot be retroactively imposed on newly competitive mar-
kets or spheres.7 5 In some instances, much of the existing capacity would
not have been constructed without prior contractual or regulatory commit-
ments from consumers in potentially competitive markets to pay for sub-
stantially more of those capacity charges than they can be assessed under
a deregulated scenario. These sunk costs also generate genuine concerns of
equitable treatment for investors who made these investments with the
expectation that the previous rules of regulation would continue.7" By the
same token, as already noted sunk costs of customers create the opportu-
nity to solve these problems of transition by schemes of price discrimina-
tion. However, the availability of these expediencies in the short run
should not be called competitive, nor confused with a long-run non-
regulated equilibrium where the sunk costs are amortized and contracts
negotiated de novo.
74. Regulation had previously prevented opportunistic behavior (holdups) by replacing the con-
tracts that would have protected suppliers' interests in the absence of regulation. Such behavior might
be thought of as quasi-rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking behavior describes competition for eco-
nomic rent, which in turn is defined to be a windfall gain to a factor of production arising from
receipt of income not necessary to ensure continued commitment of the resource to a designated use.
See NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE ANALYSIS OF RENT-SEEKING AND DUP ACTIVITIES
7-8 (D. Colander ed. 1984). The pure case of economic rent would be the income derived by a land
owner because of the location of the property. Quasi-rent is a term applied to the income accruing to
a depreciating asset temporarily committed to a particular use. Sunk costs by definition mean that the
income is not necessary to assure continued employment of the resource in the designated use in the
short run.
75. For example, a particular shipper may fortuitously have access to competing railroads prior to
deregulation, but minimum rate regulation may have stifled price competition and enhanced the car-
rier's ability to charge rates sufficient to amortize sunk/fixed costs. Once deregulation is inaugurated,
neither carrier has a contractual commitment from the shipper to recover sunk/fixed costs and the
price competition that emerges is often likely to prevent the carriers from recovering all costs incurred
as a consequence of this customer's service. The question in the transition is whether captive shippers
who do not enjoy this competition should be asked to make up these deficiencies through Ramsey
Pricing.
76. For example, regulation previously served the functions of the courts in enforcing and regulat-
ing contracts in unregulated markets by preventing opportunistic behavior among rail carriers in serv-
ing joint-line traffic. Sunk costs also therefore must be considered when establishing policies towards
"competitive access" (carrier access to joint operating agreements with other carriers on interline
movements). These may call for departures from the rules, such as these advanced in McFarland, The
Economics of Vertical Restraints and Relationships Between Connecting Railroads, 23 LOGISTICS &
TRANSP. REV. 207 (1987), that ignore sunk costs in the prior regulatory regime.
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2. Limits to the Contractual Approach
Not all regulated markets are equally suited to the contractual equilib-
rium as a substitute for regulation.7 Particularly relevant distinguishing
features in identifying potential obstacles to a successful contractual tran-
sition are the number of buyers and sellers involved and their ability to
protect their interests via long term contracts.
Buyers and sellers must be able to make credible and irreversible com-
mitments to contracts that preclude recourse to regulatory intervention
when subsequent events make the traditional regulatory answer tempt-
ingly preferable for one of the parties. Unless buyers and sellers are able
to commit irreversibly to contracts, the ability to resort to regulatory inter-
vention can create incentives for a situation in which one party chooses the
better of regulation or competition at a future date as expediency suggests.
The feasibility of long-term contracts also depends on reasonably low
transaction costs in negotiating and enforcing the contracts. Large num-
bers of buyers and sellers may drive up the transaction costs of the con-
tracting process to unreasonable levels and create politically unacceptable
disparities in the distribution of the benefits. Such considerations would
suggest that a transition from regulation to competition will be easier in
interstate markets for natural gas transmission, for example, than in mar-
kets for local telephone or gas distribution systems. Rather than attempt to
out-guess the market in deciding at the appropriate margin between com-
petitive and regulatory solutions, the appropriate course for regulators is
to encourage, or even intensify, competitive alternatives and let the market
decide, reserving any regulatory answers for market failures if they
appear.
Interestingly, as a method of resolving current regulatory disputes over
how to deal with the legacy of sunk costs, particularly rates for captive
shippers and competitive access for unintegrated competitors, the vision of
a "contractual equilibrium" as a long-run goal is consonant with the
spirit of contestability theory? While sunk costs as a legacy of regulation
are a fact of life, economically sound answers to problems of the transition
can be found if regulators seek to become "surrogates for competition un-
impeded by entry barriers" (sunk costs). To do this, the relevant question
is what the world would look like if those costs were not yet sunk, not
77. For an interesting and suggestive discussion of these limits, see Farrell, Information and the
Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 13 (1987).
78. Bailey and Baumol suggest that long-term contracts be used to achieve the results of contest-
ability even when exit is not costless because of sunk costs: "[Riegulation, long term contracts, or other
impediments can slow the response of incumbents to entry. Moreover, a new firm can forestall retalia-
tion by entering into contracts, before it actually opens for business, with customers it lures from
incumbents." Bailey & Baumol, supra note 7, at 115.
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how to exploit those sunk costs by indulging opportunistic behavior during
the transition.
Conclusion
Since the goal of a successful regulatory transition is to bring the level
of government intervention into accord with the levels of other industries
as closely as possible, deregulation does not necessarily mean total with-
drawal of government involvements. Somewhat paradoxically, withdrawal
of traditional regulation may require more activist intervention to ensure
competition on equal terms where competitive access concerns are raised.
Indeed, since regulation has probably caused atrophy of many of the usual
institutions that protect buyers' and sellers' interests in unregulated mar-
kets, somewhat greater attention to other regulatory mechanisms, such as
antitrust and consumer protection may be necessary. Government atten-
tion to the development of adequate infrastructure, such as airports, air-
ways and roads, can also help by providing adequate opportunities for
competitive entry. This intervention should not be regarded as backsliding
on the goal of deregulation, but rather as part of creating an environment
conducive to making competitive markets function in a complex and
changing world.

